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Earl Cline, Esq.':' 
547 
The subject of this article, "Professional Liability," is very 
broad and could include not only malpractice liability, but also 
other liabilities of the physician and surgeon. Instead of att~rapt­
ing to discuss so broad a field, it will be confined to the subject of 
liability for malpractice and tresspass and particularly recent 
trends in court decisions relating to the liability of the physician 
and surgeon therefor. 
Before discussing cases which seem to indicate a possible 
trend in the liability of doctors for claimed malpractice, it may be 
well to set out generally the basic legal principles heretofore ex-
isting in the relationship of physician and patient. 
When a patient solicits the services of a physician or surgeon, 
and the physician or surgeon takes charge of the case, it has long 
been established that he impliedly represents that he possesses and 
will exercise the reasonable or average degree of learning and 
skill which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by physicians or 
surgeons of ordinary and average learning. In addition, if the 
physician or surgeon holds himself out as having special know-
ledge and skill in treatment or in the performance of special kinds 
of surgery, he is bound to exercise not merely the degree of skill 
possessed by general practitioners, but that special degree of 
skill and knowledge possessed by those who are specialists in the 
treatment of such ailments. 
The courts are not entirely in accord in setting up the stan-
dard for determining whether the physician or surgeon has exer-
cised the proper degree of care or skill. Some courts have re-
stricted it to the same locality or vicinity. Other courts have 
tested his care and skill by that exercised by the same class of 
practitioners in similar localities. With the general dissemination 
of medical knowledge, with the publication of medical periodicals 
and with the meeting of medical associations, it has come to be 
recognized that the standard of care and skill is almost universal. 
As the Virginia Court expressed it: "He ... [the physician] im-
pliedly represents that he is keeping abreast of the literature and 
that he has adopted those techniques which have become standard 
in his line of practice."1 
*l\:Iember, Nebraska Bar Association and American Bar Association. 
From an address delivered at American Medical Association Legal Sym-
posium, Omaha, Nebraska. 
1 Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 293, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940). 
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The rule has long been recognized that if a physician or 
surgeon employs ordinary skill and care in arriving at his diag-
nosis, he will not be liable in damages, even though the treatment 
is not proper for the condition that actually exists. The Nebraska 
Court supported this rule in Van Boskirk v. Pinto.2 
Likewise, the law recognized that there are different schools 
of medicine and the treatment of the physician or surgeon is to 
be tested by the principles and practices of his particular school. 
If he follows the accepted practice of his school, he will not be 
guilty of negligence. But this does not necessarily exclude the 
testimony of physicians or surgeons of other schools, if it can be 
shown that the principles of the two schools concur. This pro-
vision has led to some difficulties, such as osteopaths testifying 
that their training and practices are the same as allopaths, there-
by qualifying themselves to testify against a physician or surgeon 
of the regular school of medicine. 
Universally, it has been held that where a physician is em-
ployed to attend a patient, the relation continues until it is ended 
by consent of the parties, or revoked by the dismissal of the physi-
cian, or until the services are no longer needed. The physician 
is required to use reasonable care to determine when to discon-
tinue his treatment, and when he terminates his employment with-
out notice to the patient and without affording the patient an 
ample opportunity to secure other medical attendance, he abandons 
the patient and may be liable in damages.3 In other words, a 
physician or surgeon takes a patient for the "duration of the war," 
and while he can be discharged, he cannot discharge the patient. 
Generally, also, the rule has been that a physician or surgeon 
may be liable for the malpractice of his partner, or for injury 
resulting from the negligence of assistants, agents or servants 
employed by him. But he is not legally liable for the negligence 
of nurses or interns or employees of a hospital, unless the hospital 
is owned or controlled by him. 4 
In connection with the performance of operations, it has been 
generally accepted that a surgeon performing an operation in an 
emergency, or with the consent of the patient or those authorized 
to act for him, or under circumstances whereby the consent of 
the patient is presumed or implied, is not liable in damages if he 
exercises ordinary care and skill. Voluntary submission to an 
2 99 Neb. 164, 155 N.W. 889 (1915). 
s Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N.W. 247 (1928). 
4 Broz v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital .Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 
148 N.W. 575 (1914). 
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operation has always implied consent. But, an operation per-
formed without the consent of the patient constitutes an assault 
for which damages may be recovered.6 
In a malpractice suit against a physician or surgeon, the 
elaimant must prove: 
1. That the relation of patient and physician or surgeon 
existed. This relation may exist gratuitously and there is no 
distinction between "free" patients and "pay" patients. If the 
relationship is established, the physician or surgeon impliedly war-
rants that he is qualified. 
2. The claimant must establish his case by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and must show that the physician or surgeon 
departed from his duty in some respect. 
3. The claimant must prove that his damage proximately 
resulted from the negligent acts of commission or omission of the 
physician or surgeon.6 Generally, it is believed that suits against 
physicians or surgeons are difficult, because the doctors stand 
together, that, like husband and wife, they fight among them-
selves, but when anyone attacks either of them, they join against 
the adversary. The converse is true. In a malpractice case, all 
that a claimant needs to do to prove proximate cause is to estab-
lish, by competent evidence, that any one act of the physician or 
surgeon, over possibly a long course of treatment, resulted in the 
damage. 
Previously, it has always been recognized that the claimant 
must establish actual negligence; that a bad result is not evidence 
of negligence. To establish failure to use proper treatment on 
the part of a physician or surgeon, expert evidence of other physi-
cians or surgeons would be required. Long ago, Mr. Chief Justice 
Taft, while Federal Circuit Judge, laid down this rule in Ewing 
v. Goode,7 which became an established landmark. In that case 
it was claimed that there was malpractice in removing a cataract 
from the plaintiff's eye. Judge Taft said: 
If the maxim, "Res ipsa loquitur." were applicable to a case 
like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however 
slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon 
causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to prac-
tice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial lia-
bility for nearly all the "ills that flesh is heir to" .... [I]t is 
5 See Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1370 (1942). 
GWinters v. Rance, 125 Neb. 577, 251 N.W. 167 (1933). 
7 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897). 
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not enough to show the injury, together with expert opinion that 
it might have occurred from negligence and many other causes. 
Such evidence has no tendency to show that negligence did cause 
the injury. When a plaintiff produces evidence that is con-
sis_tent with an hypothesis that the defendant is not negligent, 
and also with one that he is, his proof tends to establish neither.s 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Nebraska Supreme Court approved this rule in Tady v. 
Warta.9 
The foregoing, while not constituting all the established prin-
ciples governing the relationship between physicians and surgeons 
and patients, have long been recognized as the settled rules of the 
relationship. Physicians and surgeons have come to know them 
and have governed themselves accordingly. Insurance policies 
have been written with the view of affording protection to physi-
cians and surgeons under circumstances such as might arise under 
such established legal principles. 
In the last twenty years, malpractice suits, over the country 
generally, have been rather numerous. There appear to be some 
departures from some of these established principles .. Here are 
some illustrations: 
In a Pennsylvania case, it would seem that a new landmark 
was established.10 This case had to do with the question of agency. 
The plaintiffs consulted the defendant, who was an obstetrician, 
to attend the wife during pregnancy and to deliver the child. 
The doctor accepted the employment. A Caesarean operation was 
necessary. The doctor directed that a certain intern should be 
his assistant and take care of the baby after delivery. Upon de-
livery of the child, it was turned over to the intern. The plain-
tiffs claimed that silver nitrate solution negligently administered 
by the intern destroyed one eye and permanently damaged the 
other. The trial court directed a verdict for the doctor, but it 
was reversed on appeal. 
The plaintiffs did not claim that the doctor was personally 
s Id. at 443-44. In a headnote to the decision, the requirement for the 
use of expert testimony was pointed out explicitly. The headnote stated: 
Upon questions involving a highly specialized art, with 
respect to which a layman can have no knowledge at all, the court 
and jury must be dependent upon expert evidence; and, when 
there is no such evidence to support an allegation depending upon 
such a question, there is nothing to justify submitting the issue 
to the jury. 
9111 Neb. 521, 196 N.W. 901 (1924). 
10 McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949). 
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guilty of negligence. The question was whether the doctor could 
be held, under the doctrine of respondent superior, for the negli-
gence of the intern, an employee of the hospital. This question 
was held to be one for the jury. The doctor had admitted, under 
cross-examination, that all of the persons in the operating room 
were subject to his control or right of control with regard to the 
manner in which they performed their duties. The Pennsylvania 
court said: 
In determining whether the intern was defendant's servant at 
that time, the mere fact that he was then in the general employ 
of the hospital would not prevent the jury from finding that he 
was also at that same time the servant of defendant if he was 
then subject to his orders in respect to the treatment of the 
child's eyes with the silver nitrate solution.11 
Two subsequent Pennsylvania cases have only somewhat limited 
the effect of the rule laid down in the McConnell case.12 The 
inherent dangers of this kind of a situation remain apparent. 
Recalling the decision of Judge Taft in Ewing v. Goode, which 
established the general rule that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is not applicable in malpractice cases, attention is now directed 
to some exceptions to that rule. Through the years, there have 
been some departures, such as in the case of x-ray burns, where 
the machine is entirely under control of the physician or a tech-
mcian. In a California case, plaintiff was being operated upon 
for appendicitis. He came out of the operation, so he claimed, 
with an injury to his right shoulder and an apparent paralysis of 
the right arm. The plaintiff's medical experts and an independent 
expert appointed by the court, all testified that in their opinion 
the injury was traumatic. Defendant's experts were of the opin-
ion that the condition was a systemic product of some infection. 
All of the doctors and nurses present at the operation gave evi-
dence that nothing occurred during the operation which could 
possibly produce the injury. In fact, nothing occuned at all, ex-
cept the operation. The court held that as it appeared that an 
injury to a healthy part of the body had been incurred during the 
operation the facts were sufficient to make a prima facie case 
11 Id. at 366, 65 A.2d at 248. 
12 Sacchi v. Montgomery, 365 Pa. 377, 75 A.2d 535 (1950). stated in 
dictum that negligent post operative care of an intern and nurse would 
not be imputed to the surgeon. Shull v. Schwartz, 374 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 
402 (1950) hel:d a surgeon was not liable for the failure of an intern 
to remove two stitches from an incision following an operation where 
the intern had been directed to remove the stitches by the surgeon. 
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against the defendants, under the rule of res ipsa loquitur.13 Upon , 
a second appeal of the case, a judgment for the plaintiff was 
affirmed.14 
In a subsequent California case, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur was applied where the physician intended to remove a 
wart from the plaintiff's nose. The doctor testified that he 
planned to remove the wart first, and that for this part of the 
operation the plaintiff was given an anesthetic with nitrous oxide 
and O};.-ygen. He then intended to remove the tonsils, after giving 
the plaintiff an ether anesthetic. Containers of both gases were 
in the operating room. The doctor testified that he removed the 
wart with an electric needle which gets rather hot and that after he 
had finished removing the wart and was cauterizing the wound 
with the electric needle, there was a "flash" and a "pop" about 
six inches above the plaintiff's face. As a result of this accident, 
the plaintiff suffered contusions and bled profusely from the nose 
and mouth. The jury in the trial court returned a verdict for the 
defendants, but on appeal it was held that plaintiff was entitled 
to a new trial. The reason for the reversal was that there were 
four possible explanations for the explosion and the defendants 
had produced evidence as to their due care on only two of these 
possible explanations. The court said that as the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur applied, the defendants had not produced evidence 
on all points necessary to enable a jury to find in their favor.15 
The effect of departures from the rule that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur does not apply is to permit a bad result or an 
unusual happening to require a physician or surgeon to explain 
the cause. In other words, a prima facie case may be established 
for the claimant and the burden of proof shifted to the physician 
or surgeon. 
It has been pointed out previously that the general rule has 
been that a physician is not liable for a mistake in judgment in 
making a diagnosis where he uses ordinary and reasonable care 
and skill, even though his diagnosis, honestly made, may be 
wrong. Both Nebraska and Georgia have stated that malpractice 
may consist in a lack of skill or care in diagnosis as well as in 
13 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 
(1944). 25 B.U.L. Rev. 25 (1945); 33 Calif. L. Rev. 331 (1945); 40 Ill. 
L. Rev. 421 (1946); 18 So. Calif. L. Rev. 310 (1945); 9 U. Det. L.J. 51 
(1945). 
H Ybarra v. Spangard, 19 Cal. App.2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949). 
ltiDierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal.2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947). 
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treatment.16 In the Georgia case, it was held that the jury could 
find that the defendant optometrist had not exercised reasonable 
care and skill in his examination where it appeared from the 
evidence that as a result of wearing the glasses prescribed the 
patient suffered headaches and nausea and was backward in his 
school w0rk. The only expert testimony for the plaintiff was 
given by an ophthalmalogist, not an optometrist.17 
In a Massachusetts case, the physician, it was claimed, negli-
gently diagnosed the diseased condition as a throat ailment and 
ordered the patient taken to a hospital sixty miles away. It was 
claimed that the patient was, at the time, suffering with pneumo-
nia. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support 
a finding that the defendant should have known that the intestate 
was suffering from pneumonia, even if the throat ailment from 
which he was also suffering, displayed some symptoms that were 
characteristic of pneumonia.18 
In an Ohio case, the physician incorrectly diagnosed a pa-
tient's pregnancy as gall bladder trouble and treated the patient 
for that ailment. The court held that the question as to whether 
the physician had used due care and diligence in making the 
diagnosis was one of fact for the jury where there is more than 
a scintilla of evidence tending to indicate the absence of such 
care and diligence. The court further held that as the physician 
knew that other medical men had diagnosed the symptons dif-
ferently there was a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's 
verdjct.10 
In a United States Court of Appeals case, a patient sustained 
a fractured skull and was unconscious for several days. The 
physicians treated the patient for the fractured skull but failed 
to discover a fractured hip. It was held that the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case of negligence, which put the burden 
upon the physicians of proving that the condition of the plantiff's 
head was such that examination and treatment of the hip would 
have endangered her life.20 
In another class of cases, those dealing with consent to sur-
gery, the Nebraska Supreme Court has defined a restriction of 
the consent doctrine in cases where the surgeon relies upon the 
16 See l\Iangiamel v . .Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1934); Cook 
v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529, 79 A.L.R. 694 (1931). 
17Kahn v. Shaw, 65 Ga. 563, 16 S.E.2d 99 (1941). 
1s Coburn v. Moore. 320 Mass. 116, 68 N.E.2d 5 (1946). 
19 Paulson v. Stocker, 53 Ohio .App. 229, 4 N.E.2d 609 (1935). 
2oweintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937). 
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diagnosis of another physician.21 In this case, a physician sent 
the patient to a surgeon with a diagnosis of a pelvic tumor. The 
surgeon operated, found no tumor, made a diagnosis of pregnancy, 
and in connection with the operation, removed the plaintiff's ap-
pendix. The court said: 
Where, under the above conditions of employment, the sur-
geon, relying wholly upon the physician's diagnosis, operates, and 
during the course thereof discovers facts or conditions which sug-
gest a reasonable basis for a different conclusion from that ar-
rived at by the physician which, if true, would make the proposed 
operation inadvisable or unnecessary, and there exists no emer-
gency requiring him to proceed, the surgeon is not negligent if 
he refrains from completing the operation until a further proper 
diagnosis based upon the newly discovered facts or condition is 
made, and a proper course of action ba:sed thereon is determined. 
Likewise, where, under the above conditions of employment, 
and before performing the operation, the surgeon discovers facts 
or conditions which appear to contradict the physican's diagnosis, 
or which cause the surgeon to question the correctness of the 
physician's diagnosis or to reach a different diagnosis, with the 
result that a different or no operative treatment is indicated, and 
there is no emergency, and the surgeon operates without making 
an additional and proper diagnosis to determine the questions 
presented and the action to be taken, the surgeon is negligent 
and liable to respond in damages for such injury and detriment 
to the patient as proximately follows.22 
The members of the medical profession may find the follow-
ing suggestions helpful. 
1. Do not guarantee results or a cure, as a suit could then 
be grounded on a breach of an express contract and not upon an 
implied contract. In such a case, expert medical testimony, in 
all probability, would not be required to be produced by the plain-
tiff. 
2. Be careful in diagnosis, irrespective of whether the pa-
tient is a pay or a charity patient, and if the case is one where 
the services of a specialist should be secured, then the specialist 
should be called in for consultation or the patient referred to the 
specialist. 
3. Keep abreast of the great progress being made in medi-
cine, for today the physician and surgeon are most likely to be 
charged with knowledge of such progress. The North Dakota 
court expressed it in these words : 
21 In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944). 
22 Id. at 344, 16 N.W.2d at 511. 
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The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as 
they exist, and not by what they have been in the past or may be 
in the future. Today, with the rapid methods of transportation 
and easy means of communication, the horizons have been widen-
ed, and the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing 
the means at hand in the particular village where he is practicing. 
So far as medical treatment is concerned, the borde-rs of the 
locality and community have, in effect, been extended so as to 
include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treat-
ment may be had which the local physician, because of limited 
facilities or training, is unable to give.23 
23Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 344, 294 N.W. 183, 188 (1940). 
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